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Abstract 
The widespread use of Grid technology and 
distributed compute power, with all its 
inherent benefits, will only be established if the 
use of that technology can be guaranteed 
efficient and secure. The predominant method 
for currently enforcing security is through the 
use of public key infrastructures (PKI) to 
support authentication and the use of access 
control lists (ACL) to support authorisation. 
These systems alone do not provide enough 
fine-grained control over the restriction of 
user rights, necessary in a dynamic Grid 
environment. This paper compares the 
implementation and experiences of using the 
current standard for Grid authorisation with 
Globus - the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) 
- with the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
authorisation infrastructure PERMIS. The 
suitability of these security infrastructures for 
integration with regard to existing Grid 
technology is presented based upon 
experiences within the JISC-funded DyVOSE 
project. 
1. Introduction
Institutions in science and industry are 
increasingly turning to distributed computer 
technology to achieve higher efficiency and 
greater production. Grid technologies allow 
distributed resources such as data storage or 
CPU compute power to be made available to a 
much wider user base beyond the original 
domain. To gain optimum use of this resource 
sharing, institutions form collaborative 
communities known as Virtual Organisations 
(VOs). Within these VOs, a flexible approach 
to resource use and acquisition must be 
adopted but as the degree of trust between 
participants varies, it must not be at the 
expense of security. 
To enforce security in such an open and 
dynamic environment presents many 
challenges and any solution must allow for a 
variety of fine-grained security policies to be 
realised. At the same time, this infrastructure 
needs to be simple to use, set up and deploy.  
The most common approach for security is 
based upon authentication, whereby a user 
makes an action request and they are 
challenged to prove their identity. This is 
commonly realised by means of a Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). In a PKI, a root of trust 
issues certificates and keys to trusted users; 
these are, upon request, presented to a gate-
keeper that protects the resource. To enforce 
authorisation, the process of allowing a user 
certain access privileges based on who they 
are, the most basic (and currently most 
widespread) method is to use an Access 
Control List (ACL). The ACL simply lists 
which users are allocated given privileges. 
These privileges are often achieved through 
mapping user requests to specific accounts on 
those protected resources, e.g. through a grid-
mapfile which maps a distinguished name 
(DN) to a local user account. 
Both these methods of security are very 
coarse-grained and static in their ability to 
ascertain the privileges of a user, and hence 
their ability to provide a decision on a resource 
request. Grid technology requires dynamic and 
quick authorisation decisions, once again 
emphasising a balance between flexibility and 
security.
Many solutions to this have been proposed in 
the Grid community and currently no one 
standard has been widely adopted. PERMIS [5, 
6, 7], CAS [2], VOMS [8], Cardea [3] and 
Akenti [1] are all examples of authorisation 
infrastructures. In this paper we present the 
implementation effort involved in setting up 
and using the Grid Security Infrastructure 
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(GSI) [4], which exemplifies the use of an 
ACL, and PERMIS, which uses an advanced 
infrastructure based on Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC). The implementation and 
application of these infrastructures is discussed 
along with an outline of the performance 
overheads in applying these technologies. 
2. Authorisation Background 
Authorisation is closely linked to 
authentication. Once a user has had their 
identity validated at a remote resource, it is 
essential that users actions are restricted based 
on who they are, what they are trying to do, 
and in what context etc. There are various 
methods of enforcing this restriction, the 
simplest method being the use of an Access 
Control List (ACL), which lists what users 
have access to a privilege. 
Essentially, a user presents their credentials at 
the gate-keeper to a resource, which consults a 
list of users. This basic authorisation structure 
extends the concept of authentication and no 
more. If the user cannot authenticate to the 
satisfaction of the gate-keeper then the 
resource request will be denied. A problem 
that arises when trying to apply this method to 
a dynamic Grid environment is that only one 
list exists, where there could be many 
privileges that require different ACLs. For 
example, a user might need access to a given 
resource for different purposes within a given 
VO. Having a single list with a predefined set 
of accounts and user DNs does not support this 
multi-role approach.  This is a solution that 
would not scale well in a large VO. 
A more sophisticated method of applying 
authorisation controls is through use of Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) mechanisms, 
which allow Privilege Management 
Infrastructures (PMI). 
2.1 PMI & Role-Based Access Control 
The relationship between a PMI and 
authorisation is similar to the relationship 
between a PKI and authentication. 
Consequently, there are many similar concepts 
in the two types of infrastructure. 
Central to a PMI is the idea of the attribute 
certificate (AC), which maintains a binding 
between the user and their privilege attributes. 
It is similar in notion to the public key 
certificate in a PKI. The entity that signs a 
public key certificate is a Certification 
Authority (CA); the entity that signs attribute 
certificates is called an Attribute Authority 
(AA). The root of trust of a PKI is often called 
the root CA, which can delegate this trust to a 
subordinate CA; the root of trust of a PMI is 
called the Source of Authority (SOA). The 
SOA may have subordinate authorities to 
which it can delegate powers of authorisation. 
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), which 
show a list of certificates that should not 
longer be accepted as valid, exist in a PKI; 
Attribute Certificate Revocation Lists 
(ACRLs) exist in a PMI [15]. 
The critical idea in a PMI is that the access 
rights of a user are not held in an ACL but in 
the privilege attributes of the ACs that are 
issued to the users. This is the central idea 
behind RBAC – the privilege attribute will 
describe one or more of the user’s rights and 
the target resource will then read a user’s AC 
to see if they are allowed to perform the action 
being requested. This de-couples the user’s 
privileges from their local identity and allows 
a more dynamic and flexible approach to 
access control. 
The X.812 | ISO 10181-3 Access Control 
Framework standard [19] defines a generic 
framework to support this type of 
authorisation, depicted in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Overview of X.812 Access Control 
Function 
In this model, the initiator attempts to access a 
target in a remote domain. Two key 
components support authorised access to the 
target: a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), 
described in the figure as the Access control 
Enforcement Point (AEF), and a Policy 
Decision Point (PDP), described as the Access 
control Decision Function (ADF). The PEP 
ensures that all requests to access the target are 
run through the PDP and the PDP casts the 
authorisation decision on the request based on 
a collection of rules (policies).  To provide a 
generic interface between this framework and 
grid-enabled applications, an API has been 
proposed and created. 
Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on High Performance Computing Systems and Applications (HPCS’05) 
1550-5243/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE 
2.2 GGF SAML AuthZ API & PERMIS 
The GGF (Global Grid Forum) have put 
forward an API that provides a generic PEP, 
which can be associated with an arbitrary 
authorisation infrastructure. The specification 
for Grid technologies is an enhanced profile of 
the OASIS (Organisation for the Advancement 
of Structured Information Standards) Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v1.1 
[21]. 
The OASIS SAML AuthZ specification 
defines a message exchange between a PEP 
and PDP consisting of an 
AuthorizationDecisionQuery (which contains a 
subject, a resource and an action) going from 
PEP to PDP, and an assertion returned 
containing a number of 
AuthorizationDecisionStatements.
The GGF SAML AuthZ specification [20] 
defines a SimpleAuthorizationDecisionStatement
(a boolean stating “granted/denied”) and an 
ExtendedAuthorisationDecisionQuery that allows 
the PEP to specify whether the simple or full 
authorisation decision is to be returned. Figure 
2 shows the interactions supported by this API. 
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Figure 2: GGF SAML AuthZ API 
By using this API, a generic policy 
enforcement engine can be constructed, that 
can be used by arbitrary grid services. Instead 
of having to explicitly create new policy 
engines for every application, the information 
can be incorporated into the deployment 
descriptor of the service and together with the 
policy identifier, the policy repository and the 
user DN, authorisation checks can be made for 
every method that is accessed on a service. 
The PDP in the model above has been realised 
in the form of the Privilege and Role 
Management Infrastructure Standards 
Validation (PERMIS) initiative. This is an EC 
project that has built an authorisation 
infrastructure to realise a scalable X.509 
Attribute Certificate based PMI.  
The PERMIS software provides an RBAC 
authorisation infrastructure that uses XML 
based policies, specifying the access control 
decisions to be made for given resources 
within a VO. The rules that the policy covers 
include: 
? subject definitions 
? source of authority definitions 
? roles and their hierarchies 
? target resources 
? which roles are allowed to perform which 
actions 
Through implementing PERMIS, a dynamic 
and flexible authorisation infrastructure is 
established. 
3. Establishing and Using Grid 
Security Infrastructures 
To explore Grid security requires Grid services 
to have been implemented. Within the 
BRIDGES [29] and DyVOSE [11] projects 
various Globus Toolkit (v3.3) services have 
been prototyped. The steps for creating these 
services are similar: 
? Create a schema file in GWSDL (Grid 
Web Services Description Language – a 
temporary version of WSDL for use with 
the OGSI specification). 
? Implement the service operations 
? Construct a deployment descriptor for the 
service 
? Generate and compile the necessary stub 
classes.  
? Package these into a Grid ARchive 
(GAR) file, and deploy it into the Globus 
container. The service URI is published 
upon starting the container. 
The client that uses this basic grid service must 
have access to two classes specifically 
generated for this service: 
? The first implements the 
GridServiceLocator interface and provides 
the handle on the service instance. 
? The second implements the 
GridServicePortType interface and is the 
stub, which interacts with the service 
handle. This is the class instance upon 
which the service operations are 
performed. 
To provide access to the authorisation 
infrastructures requires that the infrastructures 
are set up and that the services and clients 
developed above are modified to use the 
infrastructure. 
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3.1 Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) 
Some general security features must be put in 
place before GSI can be used. A host 
certificate and key must be available to allow 
the Globus container to be started up securely. 
Also the root certificate and signing policy of 
the CA that issued these certificates must be 
available – in this implementation, the UK e-
Science Certificate Authority [18] (based in 
the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) was 
used, as this provides trust on a national scale. 
To set up the authorisation infrastructure in 
GSI requires a grid-map file, which provides 
the ACL. The grid-map file is traditionally 
placed in the /etc/grid-security/ folder. The file 
is a list that maps Distinguished Names (DNs) 
to local usernames. This provides local 
authorisation control, with access to requested 
(secured) resources being permitted or denied 
depending on whether the DN produced by 
creating a proxy certificate corresponds to an 
entry on that list. To demand additional 
security requirements such as encryption or 
signatures, a customised security configuration 
file can be written. (The default is gsi-security-
config.xml.) 
To make use of this infrastructure requires 
modification of the deployment descriptor to 
point to the ACL. The service is pointed to the 
gridmap file by adding the following 
parameters to the deployment descriptor 
(server-deploy.wsdd) before building and 
deployment: 
<parameter = “authorisation”, 
value = “gridmap”/> 
<parameter = “gridmap”, 
 value = “/etc/grid-security/ 
grid-mapfile”/>
Modifying the deployment descriptor to use a 
security configuration file is done by adding a 
similar parameter called “securityConfig”. To 
enable strong authentication on the client 
requires setting properties on the stub. To 
enable the client to “shake hands” with the 
service in a secure manner, properties on the 
relevant stubs must be set so that an action will 
only take place if strong authentication has 
taken place and the requesting action call has 
been found to be valid. In order to do this the 
following code is inserted into the client class 
to set these properties: 
((Stub)stubname)._setProperty(
Constants.GSI_SEC_CONV,
Constants.ENCRYPTION);
This property demands that a secure 
conversation is set up by requiring that the stub 
has method calls encrypted. 
     
((Stub)stubname)._setProperty(
Constants.AUTHORIZATION,
HostAuthorization.getInstance())
This property allows the client call to be 
authorised if a hostname is returned. This is an 
example of client-side authorisation that is 
performed in addition to the grid-map 
authorisation set up on the server side. 
Once these modifications have been made, all 
services that have these security features 
enabled, can be accessed by only those users 
with DNs present on the ACL. (This is 
essentially security at the container level.) The 
users identify themselves by creating proxy 
certificates from their own certificate, located 
in their home directory. 
3.2 PERMIS
In the context of securing grid services, 
PERMIS is provided in the form of a grid 
service itself, deployed into the same container 
as the service to be restricted. This PERMIS 
service acts as the PEP between the target and 
the PDP. To implement the service, a GAR file 
is downloaded from the PERMIS development 
pages [28] and deployed into the container. 
The infrastructure requires a Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server to 
store the roles and policies in the form of 
attribute certificates. The server is set up so 
that the DNs on the proxy certificates of the 
domains, users and central managers 
correspond to the location of the user 
certificates. This allows the client to be 
identified when making the service call. The 
version used is OpenLDAP v2.1, obtained by 
CVS from the OpenLDAP software repository 
[26]. The LDAP server process can reside on a 
separate machine as long as this is visible from 
the machine running the Globus container, by 
means of an IP address. 
In the DyVOSE project [10], to provide users 
with certificates that corresponded to the 
LDAP structure, it was necessary to create our 
own local certificate authority (CA). This 
involved creating a root certificate using 
OpenSSL [22], signing this certificate and then 
using it to create and sign all subsequent user 
certificates. This root certificate, originally 
created in Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) 
format, was converted to Direct Encoding 
Rules (DER) format and was imported into the 
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Source of Authority (SOA) node on the LDAP 
server. The p12 (Personal Information 
Exchange) file created for the SOA user was 
then used to sign all the attribute certificates 
created using the privilege allocator (see 
below). As is standard when using Globus in a 
security context, the user certificate and key 
must be extracted from the p12 file that has 
been distributed from their certificate authority 
and must be placed in a folder called .globus/
beneath their home directory. The signing 
policy and root certificate associated with the 
certificate authority must be placed in a folder 
called certificates/ beneath the aforementioned 
.globus/ folder, for each user. UK e-Science 
[18] certificates were not used for DyVOSE, 
but will be in future project implementations. 
This will allow a much wider user base as UK 
e-Science certificates are trusted on a national 
scale, whereas a local CA is only trusted by the 
certificates that it issues and has local control 
over. To attempt to scale the local CA model 
up would involve complicated issues such as 
creating CA “bridges”. [23]  
Two important user tools exist that allow the 
necessary XML security policies and attribute 
certificates to be created.  The policy editor is 
a graphical user interface that allows XML 
policies to be created using English semantics. 
By presenting the concept of domains and 
roles in terms that are understandable by non-
computer scientists, the policy editor takes the 
input from the policy writer and generates a 
policy that fits the necessary XML syntax. The 
critical parts of the policy are the users, targets 
and actions specified. The other important 
graphical tool is the privilege allocator, which 
allows attribute certificates to be created. 
These attribute certificates, in DER format, can 
comprise either the XML policy or the role 
that a user can take. 
To allow the grid service to be authorised 
using the PERMIS Authorisation Service, 
three parameters must be added to the 
deployment descriptor, either in server-
deploy.wsdd before the service is deployed or 
under the relevant service name in server-
config.wsdd, located in the Globus installation 
directory. These parameters are: 
<parameter = “authorization”, 
value = “custom”/> 
<parameter = “authzClass”,
value = “org.globus.ogsa.impl 
.security.authorization
.SAMLAuthorisationCallout” /> 
<parameter = “authzService”,
value = “http://localhost:8080/ 
ogsa/services/decider/
PermisAuthorizationService”/>
These parameters indicate the customised 
nature of the authorisation, the class that will 
be used for implementing the authorisation 
service and the URI that will actually provide 
the authorisation service. 
Additionally, the PERMIS service must be 
pointed towards the LDAP server, the policy 
that you wish to use and the source of 
authority that manages the policy and roles 
within this domain. In order to do this, the 
following parameters must be added (or 
modified) within server-config.wsdd under the 
“decider/PermisAuthorisationService”: 
<parameter = “LDAP”,
value = “ldap://cassini. 
nesc.gla.ac.uk:389”/>
<parameter = “OID”, 
value = “1.0.0.1”/> 
<parameter = “SOA”, 
value = “cn=Administrator,
o=University of Glasgow, c=GB”/> 
The DN given by the client user’s proxy 
certificate provides the identification necessary 
for the PERMIS engine to recognise what user 
is making the service call. To pick the DN up 
and use it in this context requires extra Globus 
security code to be inserted into the client, 
allowing strong authentication to take place 
between client and server. The necessary lines 
are as follows: 
((Stub)stubname)
._setProperty(
Constants.GSI_SEC_CONV,
Constants.SIGNATURE)
((Stub)stubname)
._setProperty(
GSIConstants.GSI_MODE,
GSIConstants.GSI_MODE_NO_DELEG)
((Stub)stubname)
._setProperty(
Constants.AUTHORIZATION,
HostAuthorization.getInstance())
((Stub)stubname)
._setProperty(
Constants.GRIM_POLICY_HANDLER,
new IgnoreProxyPolicyHandler()) 
These properties require that the credentials 
are signed, that they cannot be from a 
delegated party, that the container must be 
authorised using the host credentials and that 
any policies created and maintained using the 
Globus GRIM (Grid Resource Identity 
Mapper) facility are ignored. 
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4.  Experiences and Performance 
Analysis of Security 
Infrastructures 
The JISC-funded DyVOSE project is 
investigating advanced RBAC infrastructures 
(PERMIS) for dynamic establishment of VOs 
within a teaching environment, specifically as 
part of the Advanced MSc Grid Computing 
module at the University of Glasgow. Students 
at Glasgow were asked to develop a Globus 
service (version 3.3 of the toolkit) that wraps a 
Condor based application, which itself offers 
two methods to search and sort a large text file 
(the complete works of Shakespeare – 5MB). 
The students were split into two groups with 
the PERMIS authorisation policy to ensure that 
the sort method could only be invoked by 
members of their own student group and the 
lecturing staff, and that the search method 
could be invoked by everyone. Students were 
also asked to ensure (through GSI) that the 
service itself could only be invoked by 
themselves individually and the lecturing staff. 
They were requested in particular to undertake 
performance benchmarking of the search/sort 
application on a single PC; on a Condor pool; 
as a grid service on that pool; and to compare 
the respective speeds of PERMIS RBAC 
authorisation and GSI-based authorisation, on 
the service. 
Their experiences in developing these services 
have offered numerous insights into the 
benefits and pitfalls of the Grid. Table 1 shows 
the various statistics gathered from the 
students - arrived at by averaging the results 
reported. The results were most comprehensive 
for jobs run on four nodes in the pool, so these 
are shown for comparison between security 
infrastructures. 
Table 1: The job completion times for the 
different scenarios.
The time taken to search and sort the given file 
typically took, on a single PC, around 2 
seconds for the search and 6 seconds for the 
sort. Distributing the application across a 
Condor pool required that subsets of the data 
were distributed and Condor jobs submitted to 
the various (16 nodes) of the Condor pool. The 
overheads in distributing the sort/search were 
significant and typically resulted in taking 
around 62 seconds to search the file and 60 
seconds to sort it, using all the nodes in the 
pool.  
The reasons for this are primarily due to the 
overheads involved in farming out the jobs 
across a network. The time taken to split the 
text files, traverse the local network, prepare 
the Condor jobs, process them, come back to 
the original machine and concatenate the final 
results gave a significant time overhead. A 
further key factor in the performance is due to 
the job being completed when all distributed 
Condor jobs have completed, i.e. one queued 
or delayed job delays the overall time. Other 
issues that contributed was the high network 
latency and the non-deterministic nature of 
benchmarking on a multi-user system. Possible 
solutions to this include the use of NFS to 
provide the platform for the Condor pool and 
also to increase the size of the data sets to be 
analysed.  
The GSI-based authorisation of the application 
required an increase of around 8-11 seconds to 
complete the jobs, compared to the unsecured 
service. The PERMIS based authorisation of 
the search/sort application took approximately 
2-3 seconds more than the unsecured service. 
The reasons for these increases were due to the 
time overhead in consulting the grid-map file 
and the LDAP repository, respectively, then 
proceeding through the necessary stages of 
credential validation. These results suggest 
PERMIS to be more efficient, however the 
error margins are relatively large so more 
testing must be undertaken before stronger 
conclusions  can be drawn. 
5. Conclusions and Future Plans 
Based upon the experiences within the 
DyVOSE project, both the PERMIS and GSI 
technologies incur considerable overheads, 
however in comparison with the overheads 
incurred in distributed processing via Condor 
these were not so significant. For Grid security 
infrastructures such as PERMIS and GSI to be 
accepted by the wider Grid community, it is 
clear that performance aspects need to be 
addressed and developed significantly. This is 
Search (s) Sort (s) 
Single 
Processor 
1.7 + 0.4 5.7 + 3.3 
Condor Pool 
(16 nodes) 
62.2 + 4.4 60.7 + 0.1 
Condor Pool 
(4 nodes) 
29.5 + 6.9 35.2 + 1.8 
Grid Service  
(4 nodes) 
31.8 + 5.9 37.6 + 11.2 
GSI
(4 nodes) 
39.9 + 8.6 48.3 + 15.3 
PERMIS
(4 nodes)  
34.5 + 8.6 38.5 + 9.8 
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especially true when real time high throughput 
Grid applications require fine grained security, 
e.g. for secure visualisation. The next stage in 
DyVOSE is to use PERMIS in conjunction 
with Shibboleth [25] to establish a dynamic 
mapping of local PMI’s to a wider 
infrastructure involving institutions beyond the 
local domain. Future uses of PERMIS also 
include the MRC-funded VOTES (Virtual 
Organisations for Trials and Epidemiological 
Studies) [24] project, which will explore 
PERMIS suitability to secure bio-medical data 
sets as part of conducting clinical trials.  
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